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JURISDICTION 
This appeal ..- from =3 Judgment writer «.?d in 
Circ epartment, on Octobei .990. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant tc Jtan 
Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
a. Do the trial court's Findings of Fact support the 
conclusion that there was leration? 
b. I < :.ria, .. art - s Findings or Met support the 
conclusion that Bruce Bell was not entitled to reject the 
contract? 
c. Do the trial court's Findings of Fact support the 
conclusion that there was no mutual mistake < which 
made the contract voidable? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AS TO EACH ISSUE 
Inasmuch •.: the appellant apparently floes not dispute 
the Findings o * t he trial court, the appellee 
agrees that the issues raised are questions of law and are 
reviewable under the standards set forth in Scharf v. BMG 
Corp ^ , 700 P. ?\\ 1 i)ui\. I \\ 1 o (Utah, 1985) and Stewart v. 
Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The appea. ^ believe that a resolution of this 
case is determined - reference to the Utah Constitution or 
to other statutes. Rather, appellee believes that the common 
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law as it relates to contracts, as argued below, is 
determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature and History of the Case, 
Outdoor Systems, Inc. ("Outdoor") generally agrees with 
the statement of the nature and history of the case given by 
Bruce Bell and Associates, Inc. ("Bell"). Outdoor disagrees 
with the statement made by Bell that "there is no dispute 
that the billboard actually provided by Outdoor Systems was 
not visible from the highway." 
It is abundantly clear from the record that that point 
was in dispute. See, for example, Finding No. 32, wherein 
the trial court found that Plaintiff's representative was 
able to see the billboard although the graphics portion of 
the billboard was not readily seen. The trial court, in 
fact, did not make a specific finding as to whether or not 
the billboard was visible from the highway. For the reasons 
stated below, such a finding was not necessciry in the 
present case. 
As a matter of convenience and continuity, Outdoor will 
refer to the record in the same manner as did Bell in its 
appellant's brief. Each reference herein will be to a 
specific numerical paragraph of the "Findings" or 
"Conclusions." Where other references are made to the 
record, Outdoor will refer to the trial transcript. 
4 
A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and a copy of the Advertising Agreement and other portions 
of the record cited in this brief are submitted herewith as 
an addendum. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are found at record no. 56-65. The Advertising Agreement is 
found at Record No. 117, Exhibit No. D3C. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although generally accurate, Bell's Statement of Facts 
is not accurate insofar as it strays from the trial court's 
Findings of Fact. As indicated above, the facts in this 
case were not undisputed as claimed by Bell, but were, in 
fact, the subject of dispute. The following recitation sets 
forth only those disagreements Outdoor has with Bell's 
Statement of Facts. 
1. Contrary to Bell's assertion, the record does not 
support the conclusion that "Brossart...had no reason to 
believe that anyone else with expertise to evaluate the 
suitability of the board would see it." (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 5.) Mr. Brossart's testimony was that Mr. Bell indicated 
to Brossart that the sign had been approved and that he 
would contract for the sign for a year. Additionally, Mr. 
Bell indicated that someone that he worked with in Nogales 
or his client had ridden the board and had approved the 
location. (Trial Transcript, p. 13.) The record indicates 
that there was no discussion wherein Brossart was advised 
that the sign location had been approved by someone having 
no experience. (Trial Transcript, pp. 48, 49.) 
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2. Bell overstates the findings of the court insofar 
as he has stated that "Brossart admitted at trial that the 
location of the billboard made it impossible for the 
advertisement to be read by passers-by on Interstate 19. 
(Appellants Brief, p. 6.) In fact, as indicated above, the 
finding of the trial court was that the testimony of 
Brossart was that the graphics were not readily seen but the 
pictorial could be seen. (Finding No. 32.) The trial court 
made no specific finding with regard to the visibility of 
the billboard as a whole. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bell was properly found liable to Outdoor under the 
Advertising Agreement because: 
1. Bell approved the sign location prior to entering 
into the contract; 
2. Bell was solely responsible for providing Outdoor 
with the billboard design which Outdoor was required to 
exactly reproduce on the approved sign location; 
3. Outdoor prepared and maintained the billboard 
pursuant to Bell's instructions; and, 
4. Bell failed to make payment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS NOT A FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, 
Failure of consideration exists "wherever one who is 
either given or promised to give some performance fails 
without his fault to receive in some material respect the 
agreed exchange for the performance." Bentley v. Potter, 
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694 P.2d 617 (Utah, 1984). The analysis followed in Copper 
State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 
P.2d 88 (Utah, 1988), with respect to the issue of failure 
of consideration is a model for analysis applicable to this 
case. 
The court in Copper determined first what the 
consideration for the contract was. It found that the 
consideration consisted of mutual promises; Blacker promised 
to pay certain lease payments in exchange for Copper State's 
promise to advance the purchase price of certain computers 
prior to delivery. The court found that Copper State 
furnished its promised consideration when it disbursed the 
purchase price prior to delivery. 
Blacker argued that since the equipment was not 
delivered there was a failure of consideration. The court 
held otherwise. It stated: 
There was not a failure of consideration in 
this case barring enforcement of the 
contract or excusing performance by 
defendants, because they received the 
promised performance, or consideration, 
i.e., Copper State paid $84,000 to Cowboy 
Computers. Xd. at 92. 
The contract between Outdoor and Bell was reduced to 
writing. (Finding No. 14.) The consideration for the 
contract included Outdoor's promise to paint and maintain an 
outdoor painted bulletin for a period of twelve months in 
exchange for Bell's promise to make specified payments 
therefore. Paragraph 3 of the Terms and Conditions of the 
Contract makes clear Outdoor's obligation under the 
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contract. It states: "Outdoor agrees that all designs for 
displays will be fully reproduced and that the displays will 
be maintained in good condition." 
The trial court found that Bell admitted "that there 
were no defects in the reproduction of the display, that it 
was prepared pursuant to the instruction of the defendant 
and that the sign was maintained for the full tw€*lve month 
contract." (Finding No. 34.) Since the trial court 
specifically found that Outdoor provided the consideration 
required under the contract, it properly found that there 
was no failure of consideration. 
Bell misapplies the law to the facts of this case by 
assuming that a condition to Bell's liability was that the 
advertising had to be "effective." The trial court 
expressly found otherwise. It found and so held that "there 
is nothing in the contract which requires the plaintiff to 
meet this expectation of defendant. Rather, the plaintiff's 
contractual duty was to faithfully reproduce the sign from 
the art work provided to it by Defendant." (Conclusion No. 
1; Trial Transcript pp. 116, 117.) 
The cases cited by Bell do not support Bell's position. 
As discussed above, the Copper State Leasing case supports 
the trial court's decision. Polyglycoat Corporation v. 
Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah, 1979), cited by Bell is not on 
point; it applied the law of rescission where there was a 
material breach of contract. There is no finding of breach 
of contract in the present case. 
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Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah, 1982) cited 
by Bell is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In 
Nielsen, the Court found a failure of consideration where 
"...MFT did not provide the equipment specified in the lease 
contract." Id. at 457. In the present case, the trial 
court specifically found that Outdoor provided precisely the 
product requested of it, i.e. Outdoor faithfully reproduced 
the billboard at the location accepted by Bell. 
The trial court properly applied Utah law on failure of 
consideration by identifying the consideration for the 
contract and by making a factual determination of whether or 
not that consideration was furnished by Outdoor. Upon 
finding that the consideration was furnished by Outdoor, the 
trial court properly found that there was no failure of 
consideration. 
II, THERE WAS NO MUTUAL MISTAKE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that: 
Evidence to sustain a mutual mistake of fact 
must be clear, definite and convincing and 
the party asserting it should be not guilty 
of negligence in the execution of the 
contract. Ellison v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 
374 at 377. 423 P. 2d 657 at 659 (Utah, 
1967). 
The trial court properly found that under the facts 
Bell could not maintain its defense of mutual mistake. 
(Conclusions Nos. 5, 6.) Specific findings of the trial 
court supporting its conclusions with respect to mutual 
mistake include: 
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1. Bell elected not to personally drive by the sign 
location prior to entering into the contract but, rather, 
made an economic decision to have its client do the drive-
by. (Finding No. 11; Trial Transcript p. 112, 113.) 
2. Bell made conscious decisions with respect to the 
art-work and directional language for the sign knowing that 
the sign was to be a cross-reader (Findings Nos. 15, 16; 
Trial Transcript p. 109.) 
3. The "effectiveness" of the sign was a prediction 
made by Bell after the contract was entered into based upon 
a concept for the billboard created solely by Bell. 
(Findings Nos. 14, 15, 16; Trial Transcript pp. 14, 115.) 
4. Bell, through its client, approved the sign 
location prior to entering into the contract. (Findings 
Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13; Trial Transcript pp. 14, 115.) 
A. There is no mutual mistake of fact because Bruce 
Bell assumed the risk that the billboard may not be as 
effective as desired by the defendant. 
Contrary to Bell's assertion, (Appellant's Brief p. 18) 
the principal of assumption of risk is applicable to the 
defense of mutual mistake. Utah Supreme Court so held in 
the case Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 
(Utah, 1985). In Blackhurst, the Utah Supreme Court was 
asked to decide whether a personal injury settlement 
agreement should be rescinded where the injured party died 
shortly after the settlement agreement was executed because 
of a mutual mistake of fact, i.e., neither of the parties 
knew that the injured party had pneumonia at the time of the 
settlement agreement. The court held that the settlement 
agreement could not be rescinded on the basis of mutual 
mistake because the parties had assumed the risk of the 
injured parties condition. It stated: 
At the time of settlement, both parties 
undertook a risk that the resolution of the 
uncertainty might be unfavorable. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 154(b) 
(1981). This Court will not nullify a 
settlement contract because one of the 
parties would have acted differently if all 
the future outcomes would have been known at 
the time of the agreement. Id. at 692. 
Bell argues that the mutual mistake in this case was a 
mistake in the assumption that "the Outdoor Systems board 
could effectively carry an adequate advertising message, 
without material limitation on the form or content of the 
ad." (Appellant's brief, p. 18, 19.) This argument is not 
supported by the record. 
Bell approved the sign location upon its economic 
decision not to personally view the sign location, but 
rather, to have its client drive by the location. (Findings 
Nos. 10, 11, 12.) It therefore assumed any risk as to the 
ability of the location to convey the message desired by 
Bell. Indeed, it seems clear that the location was capable 
of conveying a message, the problem was that Bell decided 
upon a pictorial design with relatively small graphics which 
turned out not to be as effective as Bell desired. In fact, 
Mr. Bell admitted that had the design he submitted for the 
billboard been different, it could have been seen to better 
convey the message he desired. (Trial transcript, p. 118.) 
In light of these facts, the trial court correctly found 
that Bell assumed the risk of whether or not the artwork he 
supplied to Outdoor would be effective in conveying the 
message intended by the billboard. 
B. There was no mutual mistake of fact because any 
mistake was Bell's prediction of the billboard's 
effectiveness. 
This court has recognized that there can be no mutual 
mistake of fact as to events which are to occur in the 
future. This court so held in Mooney v. G R & Associates, 
746 P. 2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987). In Mooney, the obligor 
under Promissory Note sought to avoid his obligation on the 
grounds of mutual mistake of material fact. The mistake 
argued was that the parties believed that the promissory 
note would be secured by a security interest. In fact, the 
security interest was filed late. This court stated the 
rule as follows: 
It is well settled that a contract is 
voidable if there is a mutual mistake of 
material facts...However, there can be no 
mutual mistake as to an event which is to 
occur in the future. Id. at 1178. (cites 
omitted.) 
The court found that there no mutual mistake and stated: 
The event which caused the alleged material 
mistake of fact was the failure to record 
the security interest, a fact which did not 
exist at the time the parties entered into 
the agreement, and which could not have been 
known until some time after the documents 
had been executed. While this is a failure 
of expectation, it is not a mutual mistake 
of material fact. Id. at 1178. 
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In the present case, the artwork was not submitted by 
Bell to Outdoor until after the contract was entered into 
(Finding No. 14; Trial Transcript pp. 14, 15.) The failure 
of the billboard to convey the message intended by Bell as 
effectively as Bell desired was an event or prediction which 
could not have been known until after the contract had been 
executed. Accordingly, the doctrine of mutual mistake of 
material fact has no application to this case. The 
distinction becomes quite clear when comparing the facts of 
this case with the facts of Robert Lanqston, LTD. v. 
McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1987). 
In Lanqston, the court found a mutual mistake of fact 
sufficient to rescind a sales agreement where it found that 
at the time of the contract, both of the parties to the 
contract were mistaken as to the number of cattle existing 
in a ranching operation which was the subject of a buy-sell 
agreement. Since both parties assumed that there were 
cattle on the property which, as it turned out, were not 
there, the court rescinded the contract. 
In the present case, there was no mistake about where 
the sign was to be located; the board was in existence. The 
location was specifically approved by the defendant. 
(Finding No. 13.) Therefore, the trial court properly found 
that Bell did not prove a mutual mistake of fact. The 
record is clear on the point that any mistake was solely a 
result of Bell's misjudgment. Mr. Bruce Bell's testimony on 
cross examination in this regard is most revealing. 
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Mr. Van Dyke: Well, let's suppose that rather them 
having a pictorial we had lettering, 
the full height and width of the 
board. Could that be seen? 
Bell: I would suggest it could. 
Mr. Van Dyke: So it could convey a message. The 
problem we've got is that it couldn't 
convey a message with the artwork you 
provided, is that right? 
Bell: That seems to be the case. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 118.) 
C. There was no mutual mistake of fact because the 
"mistake of fact" referred to by Bell consists of Bell's 
misunderstanding of the legal effect of the contract. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a misunderstanding 
of the legal effect of the contract does not provide a basis 
for rescission of the contract. This was the holding of the 
court in the Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1982). 
In Kiahtipesf the Utah Supreme Court held that a buyer 
under an agreement to sell real estate was entitled to 
specific performance. In that case, the seller argued that 
the parties misunderstood the effect of a mortgage upon the 
sales agreement. The court held that such a 
misunderstanding did not provide a basis for the rescission 
of the contract under the doctrine of mutual mistake. It 
stated: 
The "mistake of fact" referred to by the 
court appears to consist of defendant's 
alleged mis-perception of the effect of the 
HSB mortgage upon their sales agreement. 
However, such a mistake, if it existed, 
would have been neither mutual nor a mistake 
of fact. It is clear that even if 
defendants themselves misunderstood the 
legal effect of the contract, this 
misunderstanding was not shared by 
plaintiffs and hence was not mutual...[T]he 
mistake doctrine applies only to mistakes 
concerning existing fact and not to errors 
in the legal interpretation of a document. 
Id. at 13. 
In the present case, the contract makes clear Outdoor's 
obligation. It was to "faithfully reproduce a display 
prepared by Bell." The contract does not make Outdoor the 
guarantor of the effectiveness of the display. 
Bell had substantial previous experience in outdoor 
advertising. (Finding No. 4.) It solely was responsible, 
under the contract at issue, for the preparation of the 
design to be reproduced upon the billboard. If there was a 
mistake, the mistake was Bell,s in preparing a design which 
would not adequately convey the message intended by Bell. 
There was no mistake made by Outdoor. It faithfully 
reproduced Bell's design and placed the billboard at the 
location approved. In light of these facts, the trial court 
properly held that the contract could not be voided under 
the doctrine of mutual mistake. 
III. BELL DID NOT HAVE RIGHT TO REPUDIATE THE CONTRACT 
In order for Bell to establish its right to repudiate 
the contract at issue, Bell must prove that Outdoor 
committed a material breach of contract. As was stated the 
court in Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah, 
1979) : 
What constitutes so serious a breach as to 
justify rescission is not easily reduced to 
precise statement, but certainly a failure 
of performance which "defeats the very 
object of the contract" or "[is] of such 
prime importance that the contract would not 
have been made if default in that particular 
had been contemplated" is a materictl 
failure. Id. at 451. 
Bell's argument in support of the assertion that it was 
entitled to repudiate the contract (Appellant's Brief p. 15) 
flies in the face of the facts. The trial court 
specifically found that there were no defects in the 
reproduction in the display, that it was prepared pursuant 
to the instruction of the defendant and was maintained for 
the full twelve month contract. Since Bell agrees with the 
findings of fact, there can be no question but what Outdoor 
was not in breach of contract. Since Outdoor did not breach 
the contract, Bell could not repudiate the contract. 
Bell appears to argue that paragraph 10 of the 
Advertising Agreement gave Bell an unlimited right to 
repudiate the contract if it found that the advertising was 
not "effective." Such an argument is inconsistent with 
well-established contract law. In the case Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch. 706 P. 2d 1028 (Utah, 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court restated a number of principals 
applicable to this case which are basic in analyzing 
contracts. They include: 
1. ...court's endeavor to construe 
contracts so as not to grant one of the 
parties an absolute and arbitrary right to 
terminate a contract. Id. at 1037. 
2. When there exists only the facade of a 
promise, i.e., statement made in such vague 
or conditional terms that the person making 
it commits himself to nothing that is 
ascertainable, the alleged "promise" is said 
to be "illusory." An illusory promise 
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neither binds the person making it...nor 
functions as consideration for return 
promise. Id. at 1036 (cites omitted). 
Under Bell's construction of the contract, Bell would 
have the court find that the billboard must have been 
"effective" and since, in Bell'S opinion, the sign was not 
"effective," Bell had the right to repudiate the contract 
under paragraph 10 of the contract. Such a reading of the 
contract would give Bell an arbitrary right of repudiation 
and would, therefore, render Bell's consideration illusory. 
Utah law expressly denies such a construction in this case. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly held that paragraph 10 
of the Advertising Agreement did not provide a basis for 
repudiation in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly found that Bell was liable to 
Outdoor under the terms of the Advertising Agreement. It 
rejected Bell's attempt to impose conditions and warranties 
upon Outdoor which were not incorporated in the contract. 
The trial court's conclusion of law conforms to well settled 
law. Accordingly, Outdoor requests that this court affirm 
the judgment against Bell. 
DATED this ^7^dav of February, 1991. 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
PAUL H. VAN DYKE 
Paul H. Van Dyke 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E r i c C. O l s o n ( 4 1 0 8 ) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC., ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCISIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 893006965CV 
BRUCE BELL & ASSOCIATES, ) Honorable Judge Watson 
INC. , a Utah Corporation, ) 
Defendant. ; 
) 
Trial of the above-referenced matter was heard before 
the bench on August 7, 1990, before the Honorable Edward A. 
Watson. Paul H. Van Dyke of Elggren & Van Dyke appeared on 
behalf of the Plaintiff. Eric C. Olson of Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy appeared on behalf of the defendant. 
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was taken on behalf of both 
Plaintiff and Defendant. The Court, having now considered all 
the evidence and the arguments of the counsel and for good cause 
therefore appearing, hereby enters it: 
FINDINGS QF TM2 
1. The plaintiff is an outdoor advertising company, 
in the business of providing outdoor advertising space and 
preparing signs for its various clients. 
2. The defendant is an advertising firm based in 
Salt Lake City. 
3. At all times relevant, both Plaintiff and 
Defendant were represented in all matters relevant to this case 
by individuals having substantial experience in outdoor 
advertising. 
4. The defendant Bruce Bell & Associates had, prior 
to the contract at issue with the Plaintiff, previously rendered 
services for its client, Kino Springs. 
5. The defendant had earlier prepared a magazine 
advertisement for Kino Springs and decided that a follow-up 
billboard advertisement should be put in place. The billboard 
was to follow the concept of the magazine advertisement in that 
is (sic) should be a pictorial and should be dignified. 
6. In late October, 1988, Kino Springs directed the 
defendant to prepare a design for and obtain a space for 
displaying an outdoor sign in Arizona located on 1-19 south of 
Amado. 
7. In connection with the directions from Kino 
Springs, the defendant, by and through Bruce Bell, called 
-2-
P l a i n t i f f ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Steve Brossar t , and enquired of the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of a d v e r t i s i n g space. 
8. At the time of the c a l l , the p l a i n t i f f was 
completing a new s ign in the are of i n t e r e s t t o Kino Springs. 
I t was the only s i g n a v a i l a b l e in the area. 
9. Steve Brossar t sent a packet of informat ion to 
the defendant as a follow-up to the conversa t ion which packet 
was entered i n t o evidence as Exhibits MD-3", "D-3a", MD-3b" and 
"D-3c" c o n s i s t i n g , among o the r th ings , of photographs of the 
s ign taken by Steve Brossar t . 
10. The defendant contacted Kino Springs and 
requested t h a t i t send a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o d r i v e by the s ign 
l o c a t i o n and approve i t . This was accomplished. 
11. The defendant o r d i n a r i l y would have had one of 
i t s own employees d r ive-by and approve the s ign l o c a t i o n but did 
not do so i n t h i s i n s t ance because the l o c a t i o n was out-of-
s t a t e . The s i gn was loca ted eight miles south of Green Valley, 
Arizona. According, i t made an economic d e c i s i o n to have i t s 
c l i e n t do t h e d r ive -by . 
12. An employee of Kino Springs approved the s ign 
loca t ion . 
13. Steve Brossar t ca l led Bruce Bell s h o r t l y 
t h e r e a f t e r . Mr. Bel l i nd i ca t ed t h a t the l o c a t i o n was approved 
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and said that he would sign the contract earlier submitted for a 
one year term. 
14. The signed contract was faxed back to the 
plaintiff. Art work for the design of the sign was to follow. 
15. Bruce Bell and the defendant created a concept 
for the outdoor advertising following the concept used earlier 
in a magazine advertisement, which included: 
a. A picture which was to realistically depict 
Kino Springs; 
Copy work necessary for the sign; 
Art work prepared by an outside contractor; 
and, 
d. Directional language for the sign. 
16. The above decisions made by Mr. Bell with respect 
to the sign design were consciously made knowing that the sign 
was to be cross-reader. 
17. The outside artist prepared a mock-up of the sign 
which was intended to be proportionate to the finished sign. 
18. A copy of the artwork and mock-up for the 
billboard were sent to Kino Springs by the defendant for 
approval. They were approved and later sent by the defendant to 
the plaintiff for reproduction in the creation of the billboard. 
19. The artwork which was submitted by the defendant 
to Plaintiff had various overlays to show color, graphics, 
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proportion and, in general, all detail to be included in the 
sign. 
20. Upon receiving the artwork, Steve Brossart, 
representing the plaintiff, expressed concerns to Mr. Bell 
concerning the readability of the graphics. In particular, Mr. 
Brossart was concerned that the graphics were too small to be 
read from the .ughv&y and recommended to Mr. Bell that the size 
of the graphics be increased or that, to improve readability, 
the sign be all graphic and the pictorial be eliminated. 
21. Mr. Bell decided to keep the pictorial but agreed 
with Mr. Brossart's recomrendation to increase the size of the 
graphic be extending the width of the sign and, thereby, 
increase the size of the letters and, at the same time, keep the 
letters proportional to the pictorial. Mr. Bell specifically 
requested that the graphics and pictorial be proportionate. 
22. The sign was thereafter constructed and a 
completion package was sent by Plaintiff to the defendant. The 
advertisement was hung on the billboard on February 15, 1989. 
23. The completion package did not indicate how far 
the sign was from the various lanes of highway. That 
information was not specifically requested by Defendant of (sic) 
Plaintiff and the information, though in the files of Plaintiff, 
was not readily available to Mr. Brossart. 
24. The defendant, thereafter, asked as 
representative of Kino Springs to drive by the sign for its 
approval. 
25. The defendant was advised by Kino Springs that 
the sign was not visible from the highway and that it did not 
approve of the sign. 
26. On or about March 1, 1989, the defendant advised 
Steve Brossart of Plaintiff that the client, Kino Springs, was 
not happy with the sign and asked for the possibility of having 
the sign re-painted to show all graphics. Mr. Brossart advised 
that it would be acceptable if the client would bear the cost of 
re-painting. 
27. The contract entered into between Plaintiff and 
Defendant specifically indicated that in the event re-paintir.g 
was necessary, that the defendant and not the plaintiff would be 
responsible for the expense of the re-painting. 
28. The defendant later contacted the plaintiff and 
indicated that the defendant felt that the plaintiff should bear 
the cost of re-painting. The plaintiff declined to re-paint the 
sign at its own expense. 
29. Cancellation of the sign was later discussed. 
Plaintiff agreed to attempt to obtain new advertising for the 
space but indicated that the defendant must pay for the space 
until it was resold. 
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30. The parties also had a discussion with respect to 
relocating the sign to Kino Springs as a form of settlement. 
31. None of the settlement negotiations resulted in a 
resolution of the matter and no settlement agreement was 
obtained. 
32. After the sign was in place, Steve Brossart, of 
Plaintiff/ drove by the sign and, in his opinion, the graphics 
were not readily seen but the pictorial could be seen. 
33. After the sign was in place, Larry Pinnock, a 
representative of Defendant, drove by the sign three times and 
could not see the sign on his drive-bys. On his last drive-by, 
he took a number of measurements with respect to the distance of 
the sign from the highway. Those measurements, which are 
undisputed, show that the sign was approximately 200 yards from 
the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lane of traffic 
on 1-19. 
34. The defendant admits that there were no defects 
in the reproduction of the display, that it was prepared 
pursuant to the instructions of the defendant and that the sign 
was maintained for the full twelve month contract. 
Additionally, the defendant was regularly invoiced for each 
month of the contract. The defendant failed and refused to make 
any payment therefore. 
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35. The parties stipulated that the principal amount 
unpaid under the terms of the contract is the sum of $8,323. 20, 
plus interest at 1 1/2% per month on all unpaid balances. 
36. The parties reserved, pending the final decision 
of this matter, the issue of attorney's fees* The contract does 
provide for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
37. The parties stipulated that the damages claimed 
would not exceed the jurisdictional limits of this Court. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters its : 
CONCLUSIONS QF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the defendant failed to pay 
the contract amount based upon its expectation that the 
plaintiff would provide a sign location which would be 
effective. The Court finds that there is nothing in the 
contract which requires the plaintiff to meet this expectation 
of Defendant. Rather, the plaintiff's contractual duty was to 
faithfully reproduce the sign from the artwork provided to it by 
defendant. 
2. The defendant has defended against Plaintiff's 
claim on the fcasis that there was no failure of consideration. 
The Court finds that there was no such failure of consideration 
because such a finding requires a finding that the party making 
the claim be without fault. The Court specifically finds and 
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concludes that the defendant was negligent by not viewing the 
sign location itself prior to the completion of the contract. 
3. The Court finds that although there may have been 
unequal consideration in this contract that the disparity in 
consideration was not unconscionable and, therefore, does not 
find a failure of consideration by reason of unconscionability 
in the disparity of consideration. 
4. The defendant has claimed that it had a right to 
reject the contract and that it exercised that right. The 
defendant bases its defense upon paragraph 10 of the second page 
of the contract. The Court agrees that defendant's concern with 
regard to readability and the*effectiveness of the sign was 
communicated to the plaintiff within a reasonable time. The 
issue, therefore, is: Can paragraph 10 of the contract be 
reasonably interpreted to give the defendant a right to total 
rejection upon dissatisfaction with the final product? The 
Court finds that such a reading cannot be given to the contract 
for the reason that paragraph 10 of the contract does not go 
that far and dees not support Defendant' s claim of right to 
rejection of the entire contract, 
5. The defendant has defended against Plaintiff's 
claim on the basis of mutual mistake. The Court finds that 
mutual mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was 
a risk which was assumed by the parties. The Court finds that 
-9-
the risk of the effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by 
the defendant and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by 
reason of mutual mistake. 
6. Additionally, the Court finds that mutual mistake 
is not a viable defense if the mistake concerns a prediction or 
judgment. The Court finds that the effectiveness of the sign 
was a prediction or judgment made by the defendant despite the 
advise by Steve Brossart that the sign should be changed to all 
graphic to be readable. 
7. The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment in the sum of 58,323.20 principal amounts, together 
with interest on the unpaid balances at 1 1/2% per month, plus 
Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The judgment 
shall not, by stipulation of the parties, exceed the 
jurisdictional limit of the Court. 
8. Judgment should be rendered accordingly. 
DATED this 3 d aY of fdrfeir* , 1990. 
BY THtTcOURT 
/ / / 
SfUDGE 
-in-
ADVERTISING ^Qq 
2810 W. Camelback Rd.. Phoenix, AZ 85017 (602) 246-9589 ^ / \ 
Ca- ~((j><2& PAINTED BULLETIN AGREEMENT 
BRDCE B^j^ft-RgSOCK^Ea^ <*<M*tt*r) (Agency) hereb 
contracts withptrfDOOR SYSTEMS (Outdoor) for the^eiqting and maintenance (Service) of the outdoor advertising display a 
described bpfow upon the terms and conditions set forth Iruhle contract for a period of __12—f t w e l v e ) montns 
commencing nftflft.mhpr 2fi„, 1988—(uprtn romp 1 fit-Inn) __ — 
LOCATION D.E.C. ILL. COPY SIZE COST PER MONTr 
Tuv&vu 
Advertiser 
tfL-\\o.& 
East Line-North Face 
Board #03-1022 
13*Q Nu 10 ' A 40 ' i flOO.Oi} 
Less 15% Agencj 
KINO SPRINGS 
Special Instructions 
£,iitf*fc«vri Fv*brio«jLt»on jnd tainting It a one-time charge of $ JJL jQiL 
foot mon^'y maintenance charge. 
per square fnnt pin* $ _ u / r i paract 
Copy and/or sketches tor initial painting shall be delivered to Outdoor on or before fifteen daye prior to the commanceman 
date of this contract. Failure to deliver copy shall not defer liability hereunder effective on the commencement date, 
in t i . ' «.*nt of default m the payments under this contract, Outdoor may declare the contraot terminated and the unpaid 
balance of the total contract amount immediately due and payable. 
This contract consists of this page and the terms and conditions set forth on the back hereof, and is subject t , ic* apj: • ai c 
the general m3rv><: v of Outdoor. 
S*i»«jrnan: _ jJL c e v e n R * B r o s s a r t 
Approved: OUTDOOR SYSTEMS 
JZL 
Bruce B e l l ft Afifann-fatru 
ix&£&&&$ (Agency) 
Date 
_ General\Manager 
Address. 
(Title) 
48 Pos t O f f i c e P l a c e 
Suite 
200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
PAINTED BULLETIN AGREEMENT 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
1. In the event any of the display locations become lost during the term hereof, or it is impossible to secure any specifi 
location, or should any display become obstructed, destroyed or defaced, in whole or in part, because of any act or thi 
beyond OUTDOOR's control, or should OUTDOOR desire to move or change any location, any resulting toss of advertisi 
space shall not be deemed a breach or termination of this Agreement. Lost locations shall be replaced with locations 
equal value in according with OUTDOOR's prices and classifications. Any resulting loss of advertising service shall 
restored by extending the term of this Agreement to provide an equivalent amount of advertising service. Anything her< 
contained to the contrary notwithstanding, OUTDOOR shall also have the option to terminate this Agreement upon t 
loss of any location resulting from any act or cause beyond OUTDOOR's control, including any change in law. ordinam 
rule or regulation. 
2. Invoices will be based on the commencement date hereof, and will be prorated to the end of the month so that thereat" 
all invoices will be on a first of the month basis. Invoices are due and payable upon receipt and all terms are net cat 
Invoices not paid within thirty (30) days after the invoice date are delinquent and accrue a delinquency charge of 1 Vi % p 
month thereafter unless otherwise agreed upon. 
3 OUTDOOR agrees that all designs for displays will be faithfully reproduced and that the displays will be maintained 
good condition. OUTDOOR shall provide initial painting free of charge. Any repainting desired by (Advertiser) (Agency) 
addition to that provided for herein shall be paid in accordance with OUTDOOR's current quoted prices. No credit shall 
given for repainting not utilized. 
4. OUTDOOR reserves the right to reject any copy, pictorial or otherwise, which it deems unacceptable, for any reason. 
5. (Advertiser) (Agency), jointly and severally, agree to indemnify and hold harmless OUTDOOR from and against any and c 
loss, liability, claifns, demands, costs and expenses (including attorney's fees), arising out of any copy displayed pursua 
to this contract. 
6. Illuminated displays shall be illuminated from to 
In the event illumination is halted or reduced by reason of any law, ordinance or regulation, OUTDOOR will render a crec 
for the period of non-illumination or reduced illumination at'the rate of % of the contract price for the period \ 
non-illumination. A credit for reduced illumination will be prorated on the basis of the credit for non-illumination. 
7. OUTDOOR shall not be responsible for delays or loss of SERVICE by reason of strikes, lock outs, acts of Go< 
governmental actions, or any other act or thing beyond its control. 
8 It this Agreement is executed by an Agency, Agency warrants and represents that it is authorized to execute the same c 
behalf of the Advertiser named on the face hereof and that Agency and Advertiser are jointly and severally liable for th 
payment of all amounts due hereunder. 
9 If this Agreement is executed by an Agency. Agency agrees to forfeit any commission it may be due from OUTDOOR, if th 
billing for SERVICE is not paid within sixty (60) days from the date of such billing. 
10 (Advertiser) (Agency) shall inspect the display within days after installation. Unless within such penoc 
(Advertiser) (Agency) gives written notice to OUTDOOR specifying any defect, the display shall be conclusively presume 
to have been inspected and approved for all purposes whatsoever by (Advertiser) (Agency). 
11 The display is and shall at all times remain the sole property of OUTDOOR and (Advertiser) (Agency) shall have no righ 
title or interest therein, except as may be set forth in this Agreement. 
12. No delay in or omission to exercise any right, power or remedy accruing to OUTDOOR on any breach or default b1 
(Advertiser) (Agency), shall impair such right, power or remedy or be construed to be a waiver of any such breach or defaul 
or acquiescence therein. A waiver of a single breach or default shall not be deemed a waiver of any other breach or default 
No waiver shall be effective unless set forth in writing. 
13. In the event that OUTDOOR shall incur any costs or fees (including reasonable attorney's fees), in enforcing its right: 
hereunder, (Advertiser) (Agency) shall pay the same upon demand. 
14. This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding of the parties and may not be amended or modified, except in writmc 
signed by all parties. 
15 Thiq Anreemont <5hall be bindina uDon and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives 
WITNESS: I'm sure I called Bruce to see if he received 
my package, to see if he had any questions or concerns. 
MR, VAN DYKE: You spoke with Mr. Bruce Bell? 
WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And what was said by whom? 
WITNESS: He indicated to me that the sign had been 
approved and that they were going to contract for the sign for a 
year. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Did he elaborate on when he said the 
sign had been approved, what that means? 
WITNESS: He indicated to me that someone that he 
worked with in Nogales or his client had ridden the board and 
approved the location. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Now when you ridden the board, what does 
that mean? 
WITNESS: That means drove down the street and looked 
at the board that was proposed. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Did he say who his client was? 
WITNESS: He didn' t—I don' t recall the name. 
MR. VAN DYKE: What did he say? 
WITNESS: He just said that—you know, someone at Kino 
Springs. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Oh, I see. And you understood that to 
mean the client? 
WITNESS: Correct. 
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MR. VAN DYKE: Okay, what else did he say if anything? 
WITNESS: That he would sign it and he' d fax me back a 
executed copy of the contract and that soon following would be 
the art work. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. Did he say anything else at that 
point about what type of art work he wanted? 
WITNESS: No. 
MR. VAN DYKE: I might represent to the Court that we 
do have the original fax that came back signed—the parties have 
stipulated that this is signed. Okay. What next happened? 
First of all, was there anything else in connection with that 
packet that happened or did that—would that packet have been 
completed at that point? 
WITNESS: That was completed basically. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. What next happened? 
WITNESS: Bruce sent down some art work for me. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. What form was that? Did he send 
just a letter, did he call ya, what happened? 
WITNESS: Well, he called me and told me that that soon 
following would be the art work. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Did he describe the type of art work? 
WITNESS: No, he did not. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. Then was the next thing that 
happened you received the — 
WITNESS: I received the art work. 
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MR. VAN DYKE: Did it come in a big packet —we don' t 
have that. 
WITNESS: Okay. It's just a—it's a big--I think it 
was about this long, may be two feet, and it showed what the 
art work on the inside of the package what they wanted. It was 
mailed to us, mailed to me. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Was it like a photograph, was it a 
drawing? 
WITNESS: It' s a drawing and a photograph. Scaled out 
to the size of the board. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Was it one sheet, more than one sheet? 
WITNESS: I believe it was like, the art work usually 
comes with the picture of the board and then an overlay with 
colors depicting what they want on the board. So when you bring 
it down, you know, you lift it up, there' s what it is, and then 
you bring it down and it shows the pictures and the colors. 
MR. VAN DYKE: So this was all provided to you. 
WITNESS: Yes, it was. 
MR. VAN DYKE: On that art work that came down, just 
print the pictures if you would, maybe that would help the court, 
you look at Dl, you see, I think that' s the big picture in front 
of you. Is that it? 
WITNESS: It doesn't say Dl. 
MR. OLSON : It's on the backside. 
MR. VAN DYKE: OK, that' s Dl. Now that' s the board 
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concluding that Outdoor Systems was not in breach of paragraph 
10. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT ASSUMPTION 
OF RISK NEGATES A DEFENSE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE. 
The trial court further erred in holding that "mutual 
mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was a risk 
which was assumed by the parties" and that "the risk of the 
effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by the defendant 
and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by reason of mutual 
mistake. " (Conclusion No. 9. ) 
The governing authorities make no mention of assumption 
of risk in connection with the law of mutual mistake. Rather, 
this Court has held that "a mutual mistake occurs when both 
parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about 
a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their 
bargain. " Robert Lanaston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P. 2d 554, 557 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). "Mutual mistake of fact 
makes a contract voidable, and is a basis for equitable 
recision. " ££. (citations omitted). The key inquiry is whether 
there was a misconception, not whether some risk was assumed. 
The evidence in this case, giving all reasonable doubt 
to Outdoor Systems, shows that both parties to the Advertising 
Agreement proceeded initially under the assumption that the 
Outdoor Systems board could effectively carry an adequate 
advertising message, without material limitation on the form or 
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content of the ad. This assumption was at the heart of the 
agreement. Bell needed effective advertisement and Outdoor 
Systems could not stay in business long selling space that did 
not advertise. However, in the course of performance it became 
apparent that there were significant limitations to the board' s 
capabilities. This was first recognized to some degree by 
Outdoor Systems in January, 1989. Later, once the billboard was 
in place, both parties fully recognized the board' s deficiencies. 
A mutual mistake of fact occurred. 
The trial court erred in concluding that assumption of 
the risk negates defense of mutual mistake and that Bell assumed 
the risk of the effectiveness of the* sign. The facts as found by 
the trial court do not support this conclusion. Bell did assume 
the risk that the design of the advertisement might not be 
effective in drawing travelers to Kino Springs. However, that 
risk was founded on the reasonable assumption that the design on 
the billboard would at least be visible to travelers. It was 
not. 
Once again, the trial court apportioned fault to Bell 
for failing to discover the great distance of the sign from the 
road. However, as already noted, M a mistaken party's fault in 
failing to know or discover the facts before making the contract 
does not bar him from avoidance or reformation . . . unless his 
fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance 
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traveling southbound on Interstate 19 to the location of Kino 
Springs. Is that correct? 
WITNESS: I would imagine so, yes, sir. 
MR. OLSON: That was indeed your testimony, was it not? 
On direct? 
WITNESS: Yea, they were wanting to get people to 
Nogales, to Kino Springs, to play golf, I would imagine. 
MR. OLSON: You indicated that Mr. Bell represented to 
you that somebody from Kino Springs was actually intending to go 
by and look at the sign location. Is that correct? 
WITNESS: Correct. 
MR. OLSON: You called this a "ride the board ?•' Was 
that the term? 
WITNESS: Uh-huh. Ride the location. 
MR. OLSON: Now when Mr. B*ell called you, did he tell 
you where he was calling from? 
WITNESS: Yea, he told me he was from Salt Lake City. 
MR. OLSON: And Mr. Bell never indicated to you prior 
to the time that the sign was put in place that he personally had 
passed by the sign and had evaluated the location. 
WITNESS: No, he had not. 
MR. OLSON: And he never indicated to you that the 
person he had directed to go by the sign and evaluate the 
location had any particular expertise such as you have in 
evaluating the suitability of that sign for advertising space, 
-48-
did he? 
WITNESS: No. 
MR. OLSON: When you look at Exhibit D3A, its the 
proposal, 
WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
MR. OLSON: Now, in looking at that proposal, this is 
the document you testified you sent to Mr. Bell after that 
conversation. Is that correct? 
WITNESS: Correct. 
MR. OLSON: Part of a packet, if I understand 
correctly. Is that right? 
WITNESS: Right. 
MR. OLSON: Do you see anywhere on that proposal where 
it discloses the distance of the sign from the highway. 
WITNESS: No, it does not. 
MR. OLSON: Would you look at Exhibit D3B, which is the 
two photographs and the dimensional information. 
WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
MR. OLSON: Is there any place on that document other 
than one might discern from the photograph where it is disclosed 
that this is from the sign over to the highway. 
WITNESS: No. 
MR. OLSON: This is a north facing sign. Is that 
correct? 
WITNESS: Correct. 
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MR. VAN DYKE: Okay, So it was either here or nowhere, 
WITNESS: That' s right. We' d have gladly paid more 
money to be on the other side of the road. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. So that was a conscious decision 
you made, it would be a cross-reader. 
WITNESS: Yes, we knew that. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. And you knew that the street was 
going straight, there wasn' t a bend. 
WITNESS: We knew that. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And so you knew there would be less 
visibility than what would be desired. 
WITNESS: Urn, I can' t respond to that. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Well, you knew it wasn' t as desirable as 
having a billboard on the same side of the street. 
WITNESS: Yes, I knew that. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And the reason it wasn' t as desirable is 
because it' s harder to see. 
WITNESS: Yes. Cross-readers are harder to see. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. We knew that. All right. Now, 
when you sent the artist, or gave your instructions to the 
artist, did you give any specific directions to the artist with 
respect to the graphics of the directional instructions? 
WITNESS: No. The step that was taken there is she 
prepared a mock-up which I approved and then she executed the 
artwork. 
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WITNESS: That' s true. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Is that an economic decision? 
WITNESS: Yes it is. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. You would agree, wouldn' t you, 
that the optimum scenario would be for you to actually view the 
site before ordering a billboard. 
WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. But to the extent that it costs 
you too much to take the time to go down there, you don' t do it? 
WITNESS: That' s correct. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And you don' t send someone else. 
WITNESS: No. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And that' s for the same reason, it costs 
too much? 
WITNESS: Same reason. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And you testified that on those 
occasions when you have a site out of state you do send the 
client to drive by? 
WITNESS: Yes I do. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And you relied upon that client to the 
extent that they verified that the board was there. 
WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And you relied upon the client to the 
extent that they would be satisfied to have their message 
displayed on that board don' t you? 
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WITNESS: Yes I do. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. So at the point that you had your 
client of Kino Springs go past the board, you relied exclusively 
upon their judgment that they would accept that board, didn't 
you? 
WITNESS: Yes I did. 
MR. VAN DYKE: In fact if they would have told you at 
that point that it' s a cross-reader, you' re never going to be 
able to see it, you wouldn' t have ordered the board, would you? 
WITNESS: No I would not have. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Now when you had the client drive by the 
board, you knew the concept, didn' t you? 
WITNESS: Urn 
MR. VAN DYKE: The concept of the billboard? 
WITNESS: No I did not. Until she drove by the 
billboard I hadn' t signed a contract. 
MR. VAN DYKE: I'm asking for the concept of 
advertising. You knew it was going to be a pictorial, didn' t 
you? You did discuss that with the lady from Kino Springs? 
WITNESS: No I did not discuss that until after I 
signed the contract. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Oh, I see. She didn' t tell you right up 
front that she wanted a pictorial. 
WITNESS: No. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Have you done any work for Kino Springs 
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WITNESS: It was before. 
MR. VAN DYKE: It was before. Okay. So at that, as I 
understand it at that point, you had a proposed, did you have a 
proposal at that time, you did didn' t you? 
WITNESS: Yes I did. 
MR. VAN DYKE: So you had a proposal, you knew the 
location of the board, you had had the client already go by the 
board, and you at least had those factors before you, you knew, 
did you know at that point that the concept that you wanted to 
convey? 
WITNESS: No. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Had you already done the magazine? 
WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Well, you knew this was going to be 
compatible. 
WITNESS: I suspected it would, but I mean, it, you 
know, you can only go so 
MR. VAN DYKE: You basically knew you weren' t going to 
do a cartoon. 
WITNESS: Right. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. And so you had that information 
before you when you received the packet. 
WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Did you read the contract? 
WITNESS: Yes I did. 
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MR. VAN DYKE: Both sides? 
WITNESS: Yes I did. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. Now you describe to me in all the 
discussions you had with Steve Brossart up until the time of the 
signing of the contract. 
WITNESS: Pardon me, I don; t understand the question. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Had he described all the conversations. 
WITNESS: I believe we have, yes. 
MR. VAN DYKE: You have. Now, so, you told me before 
you got the contract, you got the contract, you read it, you 
signed it. You did, didn' t you. 
WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. Now as I understand it, the 
reason you don' t believe you should pay for the sign that went up 
is because you can' t read it very well. Is that right? 
WITNESS: That' s correct. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. Is there anywhere in the contract 
that says you' re going to have to be able to read it? 
WITNESS: I believe that it would be implied. 
MR. VAN DYKE: It's not in the contract. 
WITNESS: No. 
MR. VAN DYKE: And you didn't discuss that with Steve? 
WITNESS: No I did not. 
MR. VAN DYKE: In fact, the contract itself says that 
the artwork will be faithfully reproduced. That' s there, that' s 
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the obligation isn't it, of Outdoor Systems? 
WITNESS: Yes it is. 
MR. VAN DYKE: So when he gets to the artwork, their 
obligation is to put up accurately what you give them. 
WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. OLSON: Your honor, I object to that question. It 
calls for a legal conclusion of the contract that is a matter of 
law, and this witness is not qualified to testify on that. 
JUDGE: Overruled. 
MR. VAN DYKE: So as I read your Answer to the 
Complaint, you believe there' s been a mistake, a mutual mistake. 
Who made the mistake? Of what mistake are you talking? 
WITNESS: I think Outdoor Systems and Bruce Bell & 
Associates both made a mistake. 
MR. VAN DYKE: What mistake? 
WITNESS: The mistake is that they have constructed a 
board which is very difficult to read. It is a cross-reader. If 
it was a new piece of construction, no message has ever been on 
there, it was very difficult for anyone to determine how well or 
what kind of message would work on that board. 
MR. VAN DYKE: I find that curious. You have 28 years 
of experience in billboard advertising. 
WITNESS: Yes I do. 
MR. VAN DYKE: But you can' t look at a site and a board 
and say whether or not you can put a message on that that would 
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be read? 
WITNESS: No I cannot. In some instances I can, but in 
this instance I couldn' t. 
MR. VAN DYKE: In this instance you couldn' t. 
WITNESS: No. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Well, let's suppose that rather than 
having a pictorial we had lettering, the full height and width of 
the board. Could that be seen? 
WITNESS: I would suggest it could. 
MR, VAN DYKE: So it could convey a message. The 
problem we' ve got is that it couldn' t convey a message with the 
artwork you provided, is that right? 
WITNESS: That seems to be the case. 
MR. VAN DYKE: That is the case. Now there were some 
discussions, I think everybody agrees, between yourself and Steve 
with respect to enlarging the graphics, is that right? 
WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. VAN DYKE: Okay. Did you at that time have an 
opinion as to whether or not the pictorial would even be visible? 
WITNESS: Urn, well, obviously I wouldn' t have sent him 
a pictorial if I didn' t think it would work. In a normal 
situation I think I could count on a pictorial in a cross-reader 
working. 
MR. VAN DYKE: It, ah, is it fair to say that you 
wanted or that you approved the extension on the board? 
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